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Abstract
In a recent paper, Alfonsi, Schied and Schulz (ASS) propose a simple order
book based model for the impact of large orders on stock prices. They use this
model to derive optimal strategies for the execution of large orders. We test
this model in the context of an agent based microscopic stochastic order book
model that was recently proposed by Bovier, Černý and Hryniv. While the
ASS model captures some features of real markets, some assumptions in the
model contradict our simulation results. In particular, from our simulations
the recovery speed of the market after a large order is clearly depended on
the order size, whereas the ASS model assumes the speed to be given by a
constant. For this reason, we propose a generalisation of the model of ASS that
incorporates this dependency, and derive the optimal investment strategies.
We show that within our artificial market, correct fitting of this parameter
leads to optimal hedging strategies that reduce the trading costs, compared
to the ones produced by ASS. Finally, we show that the costs of applying
the optimal strategies of the improved ASS model to the artificial market
still differ significantly from the model predictions, indicating that even the
improved model does not capture all of the relevant details of a real market.
1 Introduction
For a long time, financial mathematics mainly focused on asset pricing, but the scope
has been extended in the last years. One of the newly established topics is the theory
of optimal trading strategies [4, 16]. Here, the goal is to maximise profit by avoiding
costs when executing an order. This is achieved by a clever segmentation of the order
volume and a prudential choice of trading times. There have been several models to
find these optimal trading strategies (for references see next paragraph); yet, since
we do not know if these models capture all relevant features of real markets, we
cannot be sure that the strategies work in reality, and tests on real markets would
be an expensive experiment. For this reason, microscopic market models are an
excellent tool for testing theoretical models of optimal trading strategies. Based on
assumptions about the market participants’ behaviour, these models simulate the
trading of financial assets on the level of single traders or orders [11, 17, 8]. The
emerging price processes show typical features of real markets [9, 15, 3]. Hence,
microscopic models provide artificial, yet reasonable, market environments with full
control over all parameters and influences on the price, known dynamics and the
opportunity to sample all necessary data as needed without costs.
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The particular problem from the theory of optimal trading strategies we focus on in
this paper involves large orders. This problem considers a trader who would like to
purchase a huge volume of shares up to time T . Since the supply of offered shares
for a certain price is limited, the trader will not be able to purchase the whole order
for the current price, but he or she will suffer from a price increase. This additional
price impact, induced by the trader’s own trading, can be lessened if he or she gives
the market time to recover; the best ask price returns to previous levels. However,
the time interval [0, T ] is assumed to be too short in order to wait for a full recovery
of the market. The optimal execution problem asks for the optimal splitting and the
optimal trading times to minimise the expected price impact. Clearly, the correct
modelling of the market response to the executed orders plays a significant role in
determining the optimal strategy. Early models assumed that every purchased block
of shares had only a volume dependend permament impact on the price [5], later
models introduced additional temporary price impacts that only affected the price
of the recently traded block [2, 13]. Yet, it is doubtful if the complex dynamics
of a limit order book (LOB) can be captured by looking at the best price only.
Therefore, recent models attempt to take the dynamics of the whole order book
into account. Obizhaeva and Wang introduced a model with an underlying block
shaped LOB and calculated the optimal trading strategy in terms of a recursive
formula by applying Bellman equations [14]. Alfonsi, Schied and Schulz introduced
a generalisation of this model for general order book shapes and gave an explicit
solution for the optimal trading strategy with respect to their market model [1]; this
model is the one we will test in a microscopic market environment, and we refer to
it as the ASS model.
The ASS model describes the underlying market by two parameters: The shape
of the LOB given by a shape function f and a positive constant ρ expressing the
resilience speed of the order book. There are two versions of the model: In the first
one, the consumed volume recovers exponentially fast; in the second version, the
best price recovers in this way. The shape of the order book is static such that there
is a bijection between the impact on the best price and on the volume. Thus, the
response of the order book to the execution of a large order depends on the current
price impact only, but not on possible executions before.
To test ASS model, we need to select a microscopic market model. The model
that serves best as virtual market environment was introduced by Bovier, Černy
and Hryniv and is called the opinion game [8]. It simulates a family of traders
on the level of a generalised order book. In contrast to a classical order book, a
generalised one does not contain placed limit orders but holds the opinions of all
market participants about a fair price; it also captures traders who are willing to
trade for a price close to the best quotes but have not placed (public)1 orders. These
traders offer hidden liquidity; they will influence the price impact when an order is
executed but do not appear in the order book [10]. Thus, the opinion game provides
a more realistic market response to orders than classical order book models.
1In some markets, it is possible to place hidden orders [6].
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In order to apply the ASS strategies in the opinion game, we have to determine the
correct values for f and ρ. There are several problems to find the value for ρ. First,
the ASS model does not assume a permanent impact in the assumptions; second, the
market recovery is only poorly approximated by an exponential function; third, ρ
does not exist as a constant value but depends on the traded volume. While the first
two items can be bypassed, the third item strongly conflicts with the assumptions
of the ASS model. For this reason we introduce a generalisation of the ASS model
that we call the generalised ASS model or gASS model. The gASS model substitutes
ρ by ρ̄ that is a function of an order’s price impact or volume impact, depending
on the model version. Furthermore, we extend the results of the ASS model by
proving that there exists a unique, deterministic optimal trading strategy for the
gASS model.
We use the parameter values from the last section to calculate the gASS optimal
strategies for several parameter sets, apply these strategies to the opinion game, and
sample their impact costs. On a general level, the sampled costs show the expected
natural behaviour; for instance, the costs decrease if the available trading time T
or the number of trading opportunities within [0, T ] become larger. Furthermore,
the simulations reinforce the advantages of the gASS model compared to the ASS
model. We show that, although the ASS strategy with respect to the right value
for ρ coincides with the gASS optimal strategy, a bad, yet reasonable, choice of the
value for ρ produces significantly higher costs; a justification for the gASS model’s
benefit. On the other hand, we find that, in comparison to the predicted costs, the
sampled costs of the gASS strategies are up to four times higher. This indicates
that the (g)ASS model does not capture all relevant details of the opinion game’s
order book dynamics.
In section 2, we introduce the ASS model and state its optimal trading strategies.
In section 3, we present this version of the opinion game that we used to analyse the
ASS model. In section 4, we determine f and ρ in the opinion game, which leads to
the gASS model. Finally, in section 5, we apply the gASS optimal strategies in the
opinion game, and compare the resulting costs for several parameter sets. Further-
more, we show that the gASS strategies perform better than the ASS strategies in
the opinion game.
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Fruth (née Schulz) (QPL Berlin) for the discussions concerning the ASS model.
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2 The market model of Alfonsi, Schied and Schulz
and its optimal execution strategies
A trader would like to purchase X0 > 0 shares within a time period [0, T ], T > 0.
X0 is assumed to be large such that the trader’s order has an impact on the price
and the underlying limit order book. We will refer to this trader as large trader in
the following. Because we consider a buy order, we first define how the upper part
of the LOB, which contains the sell limit orders, is modelled. As long as the large
trader does not take action, the LOB is described by the unaffected best ask price
A0 := (A0t )t≥0 and by a shape function f : R → (0,∞). A0 is a martingale on a given
filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t≥0, F , P ) satisfying A00 = A0 for some A0 ∈ R; f
is a continuous function. The amount of shares available for a price A0t + x, x ≥ 0,
at time t is then given by f(x)dx. Notice that the shape of the order book with
respect to the best ask price is static.
Now, assume the large trader acts for the first time and purchases x0 shares at time
t0; he or she consumes all shares between A
0
t0
and A0t0 + D
A
t0+
, DAt0+ being uniquely
determined by ∫ DAt0+
0
f(x)dx = x0. (1)
DA := (DA)t≥0 is called the extra spread caused by the large trader. In general, if
we know DAtn for a trading time tn, D
A
tn+ is given by∫ DAtn+
DAtn
f(x)dx = xn (2)
whereby xn is the amount of shares traded at time tn. The large trader is inactive
between two trading times, tn and tn+1, and the extra spread recovers. For the exact
way of recovery there are two versions considered. To conform to the notation of
[1], we first state version 2. In this case, DAt is defined for t ∈ (tn, tn+1] by
DAt := e
−ρ(t−tn)DAtn+. (3)
The parameter ρ is a positive constant called the resilience speed. To complete the
definition, we set DAt := 0 for t ≤ t0. Now, we can introduce the best ask price






In contrast to A0, A includes the large trader’s impact. In particular, the amount
of shares available for a price A0t + x at time t is given by{
f(x)dx for x ≥ At − A0t
0 otherwise
. (5)
In other words, every trader in the market experiences the large trader’s impact
after time t0.
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The price impact DA can also be expressed in terms of the impact on the volume
EA := (EAt )t≥0. Because the shape function f is strictly positive, there is a one-to-










to get the relations
EAt = F (D
A




By (2) and (8), we easily conclude
EAtn+ = E
A
tn + xn. (9)
This motivates to define version 1, in which we first define EA and then derive DA
by relation (8). We set EAt := 0 for t ∈ [0, t0] and
EAt := e
−ρ(t−tn)EAtn+, t ∈ (tn, tn+1]. (10)
The equations (9) and (10) define EA completely.
Summarising, we have introduced two versions of the ASS model: In version 1, we
define the volume impact EA and assume that it recovers exponentially fast between
the large trader’s orders. DA is then derived from EA by relation (8); in version
2, we first define the price impact DA, assume an exponentially fast recovery and
derive EA from it.
We cannot exclude a priori that it is reasonable to sell shares and to buy them back
later. Thus, we also have to model the impact of (large) sell orders on the LOB.
Such orders will be written as orders with negative sign. Let B0 = (B0t )t≥0 be the
unaffected best bid price with
B0t ≤ A0t for all t ≥ 0 (11)
as only constraint for its dynamics. The lower part of the LOB is modelled by the
shape function f on the negative part of its domain. More precisely, the number of
bids for the price B0t +x, x < 0, is given by f(x)dx. As before, we can now introduce
the extra spread DB := (DBt )t≥0. Given a sell order xn < 0, a trading time tn, and
DBtn , D
B
tn+ is implicitly defined by∫ DBtn+
DBtn
f(x)dx = xn. (12)
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Note that DB is non-positive. We equivalently define the impact on the volume
EB := (EBt )t≥0 by
EBtn+ := E
B
tn + xn. (13)
EB is also non-positive, and its connection to DB is again given by (8). To complete
the definitions for sell orders, we set DBt := 0 and E
B
t := 0 for all t ≤ t0, and
EBt := e
−ρ(t−tn)EBtn+ for version 1
DBt := e
−ρ(t−tn)DBtn+ for version 2
for t ∈ (tn, tn+1], (14)
whereby tn and tn+1 are two successive trading times of the large trader.
Now that all orders are well defined, we introduce the cost of a large order xtn at





(A0tn + x)f(x)dx for a buy market order xtn ≥ 0
∫ DBtn+
DBtn
(B0tn + x)f(x)dx for a sell market order xtn < 0
. (15)
We assume that the large trader needs to purchase the X0 shares in N + 1 steps at
equidistant points in time 0 =: t0 < · · · < tN := T . His or her admissible strategies
are sequences ξ = (ξ0, . . . , ξN) of random variables such that
•
∑N
n=0 ξN = X0,
• ξn is Ftn-measurable for all n, and
• all ξn are bounded from below.
We denote the set of all admissible strategies by Ξ̂. The goal is to find an admissible
strategy ξ∗ that minimises the average cost C (ξ) given by the sum of the single
trades’ costs:







Under the technical assumption that
lim
x→∞
F (X) = ∞ and lim
x→−∞
F (x) = −∞, (17)
Alfonsi, Schied and Schulz give the unique optimal strategies for both versions ex-
plicitly. For the sake of convenience, we set τ := T/(N + 1) = tn+1 − tn.





is one-to-one. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(1) = (ξ
(1)
0 , . . . , ξ
(1)
N ). The
initial market order ξ
(1)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
F−1
(








the intermediate orders are given by
ξ
(1)




0 (1− e−ρτ ), (20)
and the final order is determined by
ξ
(1)




In particular, the optimal strategy is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξn > 0 for all n.











f(y) = ∞. (23)
Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(2) = (ξ
(2)
0 , . . . , ξ
(2)
N ). The initial market
order ξ
(2)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
F−1
(







the intermediate orders are given by
ξ
(2)




0 − F (e−ρτF−1(ξ
(2)
0 )), (25)
and the final order is determined by
ξ
(2)




In particular, the optimal strategy is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξn > 0 for all n.
One can easily check that the orders ξ
(·)
1 , . . . , ξ
(·)
N−1 have exactly the volume that has
recovered since the last trade. In this sense, the theorems just give the right balance
between the first and the last order. This balance is found by solving the particular
equations, (19) and (24), given in both theorems.
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3 The opinon game
Next, we focus on the opinion game. In section 3.1, we recapitulate the original
model as introduced by Bovier, Černý and Hryniv in [8]. We have already discussed
in the introduction why the underlying generalised order book of this model provides
even more information about the market behaviour than a classical order book.
Yet, the opinion game has no explicit notion of orders and, consequently, also large
orders and their executions are not defined. However, we argue in section 3.2 that
the generalised order book contains an implicit notion of orders. Furthermore, we
state the algorithm that we use to simulate the execution of large orders and show
on a qualitative level that this extension leads to a realistic response of the opinion
game to large orders.
3.1 The model
We consider a fixed number of traders N ∈ N and a fixed number of tradable shares
M < N . Every trader is described by the pair (pi, ni), whereby pi is the opinion of
trader i about the right logarithmic price; the opinion is personal and subjective.
For numerical reasons, pi ∈ Z. The number of shares that trader i posses is given
by ni. In the most general setting, ni can take values form 0 to M ; however, we just














The market is said to be in a stable state if pb < pa; no buyer is then willing to pay
the lowest asked price and vice versa.
For numerical reasons, the dynamics are defined in discrete time. Every round
consists of three steps:




(1 + pb(t)− pi(t))−γ if trader i is buyer
(1 + pi(t)− pa(t))−γ if trader i is seller
, (30)
and set





The parameter γ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily. Observe that the defined
measure prefers traders close to the price. The larger γ is the greater is this
preference. Here, we assume that a trader close to the current price reacts
faster to price fluctuations than a long time investor with an opinion being
completely different from the current price.
2. The trader’s change of opinion
If a trader is chosen, he or she changes her opinion to p′i(t + 1) := pi(t) + d(t).
The random variable d(t) takes values in {−l,−l + 1, . . . , l − 1, l}, l ∈ N, and
is independently sampled for all t. The measure of d(t) is given by





m ∧ 1) for m 6= 0
1−
∑l




δB if trader i is a buyer
δS if trader i is a seller
. (33)
We assume that δS < 1 < δB to implement the idea that all traders have
a tendency to move into the direction of the price. The δext(t) introduces a
drift that changes randomly in time and acts on all traders in the same way,
modelling news, rumors and events influencing the price. This drift process is
of paramount importance for the stylized facts, statistical features of the price
process on large time scales; however, as we want to concentrate on the large
orders’ impact, which happens on shorter time scales, we assume δext ≡ 1 in
the remainder of this article.
3. Trading (if necessary)
If the market with the changed opinion is stable again, that is
pb((p1(t), . . . , p
′
i(t), . . . , pN(t))) < p
a((p1(t), . . . , p
′
i(t), . . . , pN(t))), (34)
we set pi(t + 1) := p
′
i(t + 1), else a trade happens. Let us assume that trader i
is a buyer, the other case is symmetric. We uniformly choose a trading partner
j with pj(t) = p
a(t) and set ni(t + 1) = 0 and nj(t + 1) = 1. After the trade,
both traders move away from the best price:
pi(t + 1) := p
a(t + 1) + g and pj(t + 1) := p
a(t + 1)− g (35)
whereby g can be a fixed or random number in N. This last step is justified
by the idea that the traders want to make profit and are only willing to trade
for a better price than they have paid.
3.2 An extension for large orders
For the existence of orders in the opinion game, let us consider a buyer and a seller
with matching opinions such that a trade happens. In order book driven markets,
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trades can only come about if both traders have placed some kind of orders. From
this point of view, the opinion game has an implicit notion of orders, at least when
trades are happening. This observation motivates a change of our point of view on
the opinion game: In the remainder of this article, we rather think about (maybe
hidden or unplaced) buy or sell orders instead of traders with opinion. For the sake
of convenience, we omit the word generalised in the following when we talk about
the order book of the opinion game.
To test the ASS model, we have to introduce large orders to the opinion game.
Assume we would like to purchase X stocks at time t. Then, we do not apply the




k := pk(t) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
set n
(1)
k := nk(t) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}









from x := 1 to X do {









choose uniformly trading partner j s.th. i 6= j and p(x)j = pa(x)
n
(x+1)




















k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}










set pk(t + 1) := p
(X+1)
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}
set nk(t + 1) := n
(X+1)
k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}\{i, j}
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The value g is the same random or deterministic value as in the original dynamics.
The random variables ĝ(x) are independently distributed with measure






for k ∈ N0. (36)
In other words, we execute a large buy order of volume X by taking the lowest X
orders one by one and putting them directly to the ask price such that a trade is
enforced. The number of market participants is constant in the opinion game, thus
taking orders from the tail is an obvious method to simulate a large order that is
placed out of the blue. After each single trade, we adjust the order prices; the price
of the (new) buy order is decreased by g, the price of the sell order is increased by







Figure 1: Sketch of the order book shape in the opinion game when a large order is
executed. Before the execution, the order book is in equilibrium (upper left figure);
directly afterwards, the best ask price is increased, and there is more liquidity close
to it (upper right figure). When the LOB recovers from the order, the best ask price
decreases, but the best quotes have a low volume only (lower figure); it takes more
time until the order book is in equilibrium again.
This choice of ĝ leads to a realistic response of the order book to the execution of
large orders (see figure 3.2). While the large order is executed, the new sell orders
have a great probability to be placed in vicinity to the peak of the order book’s
seller part; thus the peak grows, and the order book provides more liquidity for
prices in this region. Here, we implement the idea that the execution of a large buy
order leads to a conspicuous rise in the price that attracts more traders to place sell
orders close to the current best ask price; these traders hope that the price increase
continues such that their orders are executed. At the same time, these additional
offers provide more liquidity that slows down the price increase. If we consider the
immediate price impact of the large order as function of the executed volume, the
additional liquidity leads to a sublinear function shape. Sublinear behaviour of an
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order’s immediate price impact has also been observed for real world markets in
several empirical studies [7, 3]. After the execution of the large order, the price
increase stops and some traders realise quickly that orders for higher prices will
probably not be executed in the near future; they place new orders for lower prices.
However, most traders need more time to acknowledge that their price claims are
probably too high. In result, the best ask price decreases, but the order book
volume in proximity to the new best quote is low. It takes more time until the LOB
is back in equilibrium. This recovery behaviour of the order book is technically
implemented by the preference for traders close to the best quotes in (31) when we
update opinions. As another feature that is known from real world markets, the
best ask price does not return to the value it has had before the execution, but it
stabilizes at higher values after the order book has returned to equilibrium. We
discuss this permanent impact on the best price in section 4.2.
Since the dynamics are symmetric, the algorithm applies to large sell orders in the
same way.
4 Determining the parameters
The opinion game provides a variety of parameters to influence the characteristics
of the modelled market. For instance, it is possible to change the size of the market
or the volatility in the opinion game to simulate different markets. Nevertheless, we
restrict ourselves in the following to one parameter set, which is stated in subsection
4.1. Although the variation of parameters surely leads to additional insight, our
choice already gives a sound understanding of the problems that occur when applying
the ASS model. In the same subsection, we also describe the averaged shape of the
opinion game’s order book that will serve as shape function f for the ASS model.
Having set up the opinion game, we try to determine the ASS model’s resilience
speed, ρ. It turns out that the assumption of a constant ρ is not valid in the
opinion game. Thus, we substitute ρ by a function ρ̄ that maps both the order’s
impact and the time elapsed since the last trade to the resilience speed. We describe
how we can extract the function values from the sampled data, and argue that it
is sufficient to know the impact dependend function ρ̄(·) := ρ̄(·, τ) only; recall that
τ = T/N was the recovery time between two successive trades. Finally, we introduce
the generalised ASS theorems that assume the resilience speed to be a function of
the price impact (in version 2, subsection 4.2) or the volume impact (in version 1,
subsection 4.3).
4.1 The parameters of the opinion game and the shape of
its order book
There is a high degree of freedom in the parameters for the opinion game. Neverthe-
less, certain parameter sets have been shown to be a reasonable choice. Calibrated
12








Figure 2: The seller part of the LOB relative to the best ask price. The solid line
marks the mean values, the dashed lines illustrate the quartiles. The minimal and
maximal values are illustrated by the dotted lines.
with these parameter values, the opinion game results in a realistic price process in
terms of stylized facts. However, not all choices can be justified rigorously. For an
extensive discussion about the choice of parameter γ, for instance, we refer to [18].
We used the following values in all simulations throughout this article:
] of traders N 2000
] of shares M 1000
speed of adaption γ 1.5
jump range {−l, . . . , l} {−4, . . . , 4}
drift of buyers e0.1
drift of sellers e−0.1
jump range g random variable, uniformly distributed on
{5, . . . , 20}, sampled idependently every time it
is used
All sample runs that we did in the opinion game, either to extract necessary param-
eters or to test execution strategies, were started independently with a new instance
of the random number generator. Furthermore, the recording of data or the execu-
tion of large orders was started after 1, 000, 000 simulation steps only such that the
model had sufficient time to get close to a stable state.
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To determine f , we recorded 500 times the opinion game’s LOB relative to the best
prices. Figure 4.1 shows the resulting upper part of the order book. The lower part
is symmetric up to small deviations caused by the object’s random nature. Even if
the shape is not static as assumed in the ASS model, an averaged shape is clearly
visible. We use these mean values to define the shape function f for the opinion
game. For non-integer values, we interpolate f by assuming that the function is a
right-continuous step function. This means that we violate the assumption of the
ASS model about f being continuous. Yet, this choice for f has the advantage that
the integral of f from 0 to an integer n is equal to the sum of the integer function
values from 0 to n− 1. Furthermore, for all parameter sets that we considered, we
were still able to find unique solutions for the optimal trading strategies.
Recall that the price scale in the opinion game is logarithmic, whereas the ASS
model assumes a linear scale. However, it is possible to scale the grid of the opinion
game with a factor ε, and the difference between logarithmic and linear scale is
negligible if ε is small. To determine the order of ε, we consider an order of 200
units of shares, 20% of the market volume in the opinion game; it is mentioned in
[1] that the size of large orders can amount up to twenty percent of the daily traded
volume. We assume that the shape of the LOB, f , is determined as described above,
and the best ask price before our trade is denoted by A0. Then the relative impact













An empirical study at the US stock market show that large orders can cause relative
costs up to 3.55% [3]. If we assume that ε ≤ 0.0355/10.2, then ε is of order 10−3 at
most. Thus, it is reasonable to assume ε to be small. However, we are interested in
qualitative results; thus, and for the sake of convenince, we will simply assume that
the opinion game operates on Z.
4.2 Determining ρ for the ASS model, version 2
In the following, we describe our approach to calibrate ρ for the opinion game. Recall
that, in version 2, this parameter determines the recovery speed of the price impact.
We first describe how we sampled the necessary data. Afterwards, we focus on the
main problems of extracting ρ from those data. Possible solutions are discussed
and culminate in this section’s main result: The gASS theorem for version 2, which
assumes that the resilience speed is a function ρ̄ depending on the order’s price
impact.
We fixed a price impact D ∈ {1, . . . , 20} and run 2500 simulations for each value of
D. Each run consisted of a trading part in which a large sell order was executed at
once. The particular order’s volume was determined by its price impact: The trading
part was finished as soon as the impact was equal to D. In a second experiment’s
14
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Figure 3: The left and the middle graph show quartiles and extremal values of
2500 samples of p̄ for D = 8, and the corresponding 〈p̄〉 and p̂ (red). The left
graph illustrates the long time behaviour on the domain t ∈ [0, 50000]. Clearly, p̂
converges to a level AD > 0. The middle graph displays t ∈ [0, 2000] showing the
poor approximation by p̂. The right graph shows 〈p̄〉 (black) for D = 16, D = 12
and D = 8 (top down) as well as their regression functions p̂ (red) on a logarithmic
scale and with respect to the new asymptotic levels AD. If ρ̄num was constant the
〈p̄〉 should be approximately parallel.
part, we recorded the relaxiation of the price. In particular, the large execution took
place at time t̄ := 1, 000, 000; we recorded
p̄(t) := pa(t + 1 + t̄)− pa(t̄) (38)
for t ∈ {0, . . . , 50000}. The process (p̄(t))t∈N0 is the discrete counterpart of the ASS
model’s process DA.
To avoid problems caused by random fluctuations in p̄, we consider the pointwise







for all t ∈ {0, . . . , 50000}, p̄i denoting the ith sample. For a clear distinction, we
denote the value for ρ that we extract from 〈p̄〉 by ρ̄num. The ASS model assumes
〈p̄〉 to be of the form
〈p̄〉t = De−ρ̄numt (40)
with a static value ρ̄num; this follows from equation (3). Thus we should be able to
determine ρ̄num by
ρ̄num =
ln D − ln〈p̄〉t
t
(41)
for an arbitrary t. However, the right hand side of the equation depends on D and
t; thus, we would like to consider ρ̄num(D, t) as a function.
Given 〈p̄〉, let p̂ : [0,∞) → R the corresponding regression function of the form
p̂t := A + Be
ρ̂t, (42)
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Figure 4: Mean, quartiles and extremal values of 500 samples of the permanent
impact in dependence on the purchased volume V ∈ {25, 50, . . . , 275, 300}. For
every volume V , we recorded the best ask price before the trade and the averaged
best ask price 500, 000 steps after the trade. Here, the averaged best ask price is
the mean of the best ask price sampled all 100 steps over a time interval of 100, 000
steps. The linear regression of the mean is displayed in red.
for t ∈ [0,∞). It is determined by a Newton Gauß algorithm with three degrees
of freedom: A, B, ρ̂. Observe that all three values can depend on D. The form
of the regression function is motivated by assumption (40), which also leads to the
expectation that A = 0 and B = D. Figure 4.2 shows the statistical behaviour of p̄
for D = 8, the corresponding 〈p̄〉 and p̂. Furthermore, we compare 〈p̄〉 for different
D values. The three main problems are visible:
1. The ASS model assumes AD to be 0; this is not the case.
2. The measured data is only well-approximated by an exponential function for
large times. For small t, it is doubtful that the assumption of an exponential
decay is the right choice at all.
3. If ρ̄num was constant the 〈p̄〉 should be approximately parallel on a logarithmic
scale; instead, ρ̄num depends D.
These problems occured for all tested values of D. Next, we discuss the problems
and their consequences for the determination of ρ̄num one by one.
4.2.1 Existence of a permanent price impact
The reason for this observation is a permament impact on the order book that a
large trade causes . After having recovered, the LOB is shifted by Iper(X), whereby
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Iper : R → R is assumed to be increasing and Iper(0) = 0. Huberman and Stanzl
[12] argued on a theoretic level that linearity of Iper is equivalent to the absence
of arbitrage opportunities. Empirical studies by Almgren et al [3] reinforce the
conjecture of a linear permanent impact: The authors state that the permanent
impact is well described by the power law x0.891±0.1 with respect to a Gaussian error
model; the assumption of linearity can not be rejected by this result. Figure 4.2.1
shows the permanent impact for the opinion game. The mean is well aproximated
by a linear function with coefficient 0.02738. Interestingly enough, it can be slightly
better approximated by the power law x0.90752, a result close to the empirical findings
of Almgren et al.
Concerning the problems in determining ρ̄num, caused by the positive AD, we have
two possibilities: First, we could ignore the permanent impact such that ρ̄num would
be given by (41). This would be an appropriate solution for small t, but it would
cause the ASS model to assume that even for large t the LOB is still not close to
equilibrium; ρ̄num could become arbitrarily small. Second, we could assume that the
whole model has been shifted by AD such that AD is the new zero line. In this case,
ρ̄num would be given by
ρ̄num(D, t) =
ln D − ln(〈p̄〉t − AD)
t
, (43)
which is fine for large t but grows to infinity as t goes to zero. To avoid this problem,
we define
ρ̄num(D, t) :=
ln D − ln(〈p̄〉t − (1− e−t)AD)
t
. (44)
Furthermore, let us point out that there is no special reason to choose 1− exp(−t).
However, at this point, it becomes clear that the complex dynamics within the LOB
are poorly described by an added permanent impact function.
4.2.2 〈p̄〉 is poorly approximated by an exponential function
Since 〈p̄〉 should decay exponentially fast, ρ̄num should be a constant. However,
the existence of a permanent impact and the consequential definition of ρ̄num in
(44) makes the validity of this assumption unlikely here. Yet, even without the
permanent impact, the description of 〈p̄〉 by an exponential function is poor as the
upper right graph of figure 4.2 shows. As a result, ρ̄num is time dependend. A time
dependend resilience speed seems to be incompatible with theorem 2.2 at first, but
a closer look at the theorem’s statement reveals that ρ is only needed to determine
the order book state before the next trade, given the state after the current trade.
The time between two succeeding trades is given by τ . Thus, we focus on ρ̄num(·, τ)
and use the notation
ρ̄num(D) := ρ̄num(D, τ) (45)
assuming that τ , which is given by the input parameters N and T , is fixed. Figure
4.2.2 shows the function ρ̄num(·, τ) for several values of τ .
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Figure 5: Starting in the upper left corner and proceeding clockwisely, we show
the graphs of ρnum(D, τ) in dependence on D for τ = 7, 70, 700, 7000. Observe
that the x-axis only begin in 5 due to the fact that small price impacts cannot be
distinguished from the noise contained in the signal.
4.2.3 ρ̄num is a function of D
In contrast to the time dependence, the dependence on the order’s price impact
requires a generalisation of theorem 2.1. Now, the resilience speed ρ̄ : R → (0,∞)
is a continously differentiable function of DA. In particular, the formulas (3) and








tn+ for t ∈ (tn, tn+1]. (47)
We denote this modified model as version 2 of the generalised ASS model.
For the following theorem concerning the optimal trading strategy for the gASS
model, we need two technical assumptions:
The range of ρ̄ is a subset of [k,K], 0 < k < K < ∞, and (48)
1− τ ρ̄′(x)x > 0 for all x ∈ R. (49)
The first assumption bounds the resilience speed, the second assumption ensures
that a larger impact cannot overtake a smaller one in the recovery phase as we will
see in lemma A.1.
18
Theorem 4.1 (Optimal stratey for the generalised ASS model, version 2). Suppose





f(y) = ∞. (50)
Furthermore, let the function
h2(x) := x
f(x)− e−2τ ρ̄(x)f(e−τ ρ̄(x)x)(1− τ ρ̄′(x)x)
f(x)− e−τ ρ̄(x)f(e−τ ρ̄(x)x)(1− τ ρ̄′(x)x)
(51)
be one-to-one. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(2) = (ξ
(2)
0 , . . . , ξ
(2)
N ) ∈ Ξ̂.
The initial market order ξ
(2)




















the intermediate orders are given by
ξ
(2)














and the final order is determined by
ξ
(2)




In particular, the optimal stratey is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of
nontrivial buy orders, that is ξ
(2)
n > 0 for all n.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Observe that the intermediate orders of the optimal strategy, defined in (53), have
the same size. Furthermore, they suggest to purchase exactly that volume that has
recovered since the last trade. The gASS model has inherited this feature from the
ASS model. Yet, this observation means that also the DAtn+ are equal to each other
for all n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, and thus, ρ̄ is only evaluated for one value. In other
words, although ρ̄ is a function, the optimal strategy uses only one value. Of course,
if ρ̄ ≡ ρ for some constant ρ in the gASS model both models, the gASS and the ASS,
coincide. This is the main advantage of the gASS theorem: It determines the right
resilience speed from ρ̄; a manual calibration, as in the ASS model, is not needed
anymore.
4.3 Determining ρ for the ASS model, version 1
The procedure to determine ρ for version 1 and the occuring problems are similar
as in section 4.2. Hence, we do not elaborate on the details again, but describe how
we recorded the data and then focus on the gASS model for version 1.
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Figure 6: The left and the middle graph show quartiles and extremal values of 2500
samples of v for D = 50, and the corresponding 〈v〉 and v̂ (red). The left graph
illustrates the long time behaviour on the domain t ∈ [0, 100000]; the middle graph
displays t ∈ [0, 2000]. The right graph shows 〈v〉 (black) for D = 150, D = 100 and
D = 50 (top down) as well as their regression functions v̂ (red) on a logarithmic
scale and with respect to the new asymptotic levels AE.
Version 1 of the ASS model considers the impact onto the volume. Thus, we fixed
a volume impact E ∈ {10, 20, 30, . . . , 200}, and run 2500 simulations for each value.
Having executed an order of size E at once, we recorded how the consumed volume






which is the volume at the best ask price after the order execution and results from
the discrete nature of the model. Then, we recorded v(t) defined by







for t ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . . , 99998}. In comparison to our proceedings for version 2, we chose
a longer time interval to look at, because the volume recovers slower than the best
price. The process v is the discrete counterpart of the ASS model’s process EA.







for t ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . . , 99998}; vi denoting the ith sample. Let v̂ : [0,∞) → R be 〈v〉’s
regression function of the form
v̂t = A + Be
−ρ̂t, (58)
and let ρ̄num denote that value for ρ that we extract from 〈v〉. Figure 4.3 shows the
typical behaviour of v.
As in version 2, we have three main problems:
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1. A positive aymptote AE,
2. a poor approximation by an exponential function, and
3. a volume dependend ρ̄num.
The problems (1) and (2) can be treated as in the section before. In particular, we
set
ρ̄num(E, t) :=
ln E − ln(〈v〉t − (1− e−t)AE)
t
(59)
and point out that theorem 2.1 is only interested in
ρ̄num(E) := ρ̄num(E, τ). (60)
For problem (2), we generalise the ASS model, version 1, to the gASS model, version
1. Now, the resilience speed ρ̄ : [0,∞) → (0,∞) is a twice differentiable function of
EA. In particular, the formulas (10) and (14) from the ASS model become
EAt := e
−ρ̄(EAtn+)(t−tn)EAtn+, t ∈ (tn, tn+1], (61)
EBt := e
−ρ̄(EBtn+)(t−tn)EBtn+, t ∈ (tn, tn+1]. (62)
in the gASS model. Then, the following theorem determines the optimal trading
strategy in the set of all admissible strategies Ξ̂:
Theorem 4.2 (Optimal stratey for the generalised ASS model, version 1). Suppose
that ρ̄ fulfils the assumptions (48) and (49), and additionally
e−ρ̄(x)τ (1− τ ρ̄′(x)x) < 1 for all x ∈ R. (63)
Furthermore, let the function
h1(x) :=
F−1(x)− e−ρ̄(x)τ (1− τ ρ̄′(x)x) F−1(e−ρ̄(x)τx)
1− e−ρ̄(x)τ (1− τ ρ̄′(x)x)
(64)
be one-to-one. Then there exists a unique optimal strategy ξ(1) = (ξ
(1)
0 , . . . , ξ
(1)
N ) ∈ Ξ̂.
The initial market order ξ
(1)
0 is the unique solution of the equation
F−1
(







the intermediate orders are given by
ξ
(1)






0 )τ ), (66)
and the final order is determined by
ξ
(1)




In particular, the optimal stratey is deterministic. Moreover, it consists only of








N Predicted Sampled Samp/Pred
40 400 8.953 4.735 6.376 701.47 1867.74 266.26%
40 4000 6.128 4.813 6.154 500.24 1573.50 314.55%
40 40000 5.156 4.858 5.401 392.42 1076.89 274.42%
50 400 8.290 3.804 5.293 691.94 1853.37 267.85%
50 4000 5.195 3.875 4.937 462.51 1535.96 332.09%
50 40000 4.255 3.896 4.821 349.26 1014.42 290.44%
80 400 7.546 2.365 5.631 691.65 1832.69 264.97%
80 4000 3.732 2.442 3.371 387.98 1464.03 377.35%
80 40000 2.647 2.461 2.909 231.67 914.17 394.61%
Table 1: The optimal strategies according to the gASS model, version 2, for X = 200
and several values for N and T .
Proof. See appendix A.1.
As in version 2 of the gASS model, ρ̄ is only evaluated in one value, and if ρ̄ ≡ ρ
the best strategies of the gASS and the ASS models coincide.
5 Numerical results
Let us turn to the numerical results of this paper. We use the parameter values
determined in the last section to calculate the gASS optimal strategies and apply
them in the opinion game. We show first that the resulting costs show an expected
behaviour on a general level, and that the ASS model with a suboptimal value for ρ
suggests a strategy that produces significantly higher costs than the corresponding
gASS strategy. Afterwards, we compare the costs sampled in the opinion game to
the costs predicted by the gASS model, and find large differences. Again, we first
treat version 2 in detail in section 5.1 and, afterwards, version 1 in section 5.2.
5.1 Results for version 2
Here, we refer to the values for f and ρ̄, ρ̄num, as determined in sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 5.1 shows the gASS optimal strategies and their costs for different values of
T and N . We consider two kinds of costs. The predicted costs are the impact costs
that are theoretically predicted by the (g)ASS model. Here, we assume that the
market behaves as described in section 2. The sampled costs are the average of
500 samples with the given strategy in the opinion game. Observe first that the
predicted and sampled costs decrease if the trading time or the number of trading









gASS 3.732 2.442 3.371 387.98 1464.03
ASS 21.016 0.971 102.262 979.97 1584.12
Table 2: The optimal strategies and their costs for the ASS model with ρ = ρ̂ and
the gASS model with ρ̄ from section 4.2. (X, T, N) = (200, 4000, 80).
every fixed strategy benefits from a larger τ , which is implied by a greater T , and
additional trading opportunities can be used, but do not have to be used. Thus,
every reasonable strategy can only perform better with larger T or N . Nevertheless,
the costs of the gASS strategies show a reasonable behaviour.
Furthermore, the gASS strategies perform better than the ASS strategies: Recall
that the ASS model with the right value for ρ results in the same optimal strategy as
the gASS model. Moreover, the (g)ASS model assumes an exponential decay of the
price impact (see (40)). We have taken this assumption into account by introducing
〈ρ̄〉’s regression function p̂ in (42), which was of the form
p̂t := A + Be
−ρ̂t. (68)
Table 2 shows the optimal strategies and their costs for (X, T, N) = (200, 4000, 80)
with respect to the ASS model with ρ = ρ̂ and the gASS model with ρ̄ = ρ̄num. The
example shows that a naive guess of a good ρ can lead to much higher costs: The
ASS costs amount 252.58% of the gASS costs in prediction, and still 108.02% in the
samples.
The last two paragraphs have shown that the gASS strategies are reasonable and
superior to the ASS stratgies. However, returning to table 5.1, we see that the
predicted and the sampled costs for the individual parameter sets differ stronly
from each other. The last column shows both kinds of costs in relation to each
other. Obviously, the sampled costs are multiple times higher. This observation
is a strong evidence that the assumptions of the (g)ASS model are insufficient to
capture the whole complexity of the order book dynamics in the opinion game. It
is doubtful if the (g)ASS model really suggests optimal trading strategies for this
artificial market environment. With regard to the opinion game features concerning
the order book behaviour that we have discussed in section 3, it is highly unlikely
that the (g)ASS strategies minimise the costs in real world markets.
5.2 Results for version 1
Recall that version 1 of the gASS model assumes an exponentially fast recovery
of the volume. Table 5.2 shows the optimal strategies for several values of N and
T . Again, the predicted and sampled costs decrease with an increasing number of
trading opportunities, N , or a longer trading horizon, T . Nevertheless, also version








N Predicted Sampled Samp/Pred
40 400 16.95 4.407 11.169 1002.02 1846.48 184.28%
40 4000 12.764 4.509 11.371 872.63 1565.66 179.42%
40 40000 7.166 4.747 7.716 591.42 1064.72 180.03%
50 400 14.956 3.558 10.708 959.38 1837.80 191.56%
50 4000 11.613 3.668 8.656 845.09 1532.69 181.36%
50 40000 6.291 3.850 5.052 562.05 1012.16 180.08%
80 400 11.478 2.296 7.118 863.04 1869.49 216.62%
80 4000 9.619 2.332 6.156 794.95 1479.48 186.11%
80 40000 4.155 2.303 13.888 469.40 940.49 200.36%
Table 3: The optimal strategies according to the gASS model, version 1, for X = 200
and several values for N and T .
if not as large as for version 2, the sampled costs are approximately twice as high.
The slightly better perfomance can be seen as a hint that the assumptions of version
1 are closer to the order book dynamics in the opinion game; yet, there is still a
big gap between prediction and samples showing that, also in version 1, important
features of the market dynamics are missing in the (g)ASS model.
A Proofs of the theorems 4.1 and 4.2
The structure of the proofs remains the same as in the proofs of the corresponding
ASS theorems (see sections 8 to 10 in [1]). Nevertheless, we need to justify the
constraints on ρ̄; furthermore, the calculations become more complicated by our
generalisation.
We start with the introduction of slightly changed dynamics for the gASS model and
the reduction of the admissible strategies to deterministic ones. For any admissible
strategy ξ, the new dynamics are defined by the processes D := (Dt)t≥0 and E :=
(Et)t≥0. We set D0 = Dt0 := 0 =: Et0 = E0 and
Etn+ := Etn + ξn and Dtn+ := F
−1(F (Etn) + ξn). (69)
for the trading times t0, . . . , tN . The processes’ values between two successive trading
times t ∈ (tn, tn+1) are given by
Et := e
−ρ̄(Etn+)(t−tn)Etn+ for version 1;
Dt := e
−ρ̄(Dtn+)(t−tn)Dtn+ for version 2.
(70)
Given one process, we can recover the other one by the equations (8):
Et = F (Dt) and Dt = F
−1(Et). (71)
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Lemma A.1. Under assumption (49),
EBt ≤ Et ≤ EAt and DBt ≤ Dt ≤ DAt (72)
for all t ≥ 0. In the special case that all ξn are non-negative, we have DA = D and
EA = E.
Proof. To see that DA = D and EA = E if ξ consists of buy orders only, observe
that the new dynamics match exactly the original ones for such a ξ.
We prove (72) by showing the following inequality:
|x + y|e−ρ̄(x+y)τ > |x|e−ρ̄(x)τ (73)
for all (x, y) ∈ R2 such that |x + y| > |x|. Observe that we have equality in the
equation above if we consider the trivial case that y = 0. We define a function
ux : R → R by




−ρ̄(x+y)τ (1− τ ρ̄′(x)x) (75)
The right hand side of this equation is positive by assumption (49), thus ux is strictly
increasing. Since ux(0) = xe
−ρ̄(x)τ , (73) is proven.











π̄tn(ξn) ≤ πtn(ξn) (77)
for all admissible strategies ξ because of lemma A.1. In particular, if ξ consists of
buy orders only we have equality.
We show in the next two sections that, the strategies given in the theorems 4.2 and
4.1, ξ(1) and ξ(2), are the unique minimizers of the price functional







for the corresponding version of the model. As ξ(1) and ξ(2) consist of buy orders only,
(77) and the remark afterwards imply that these strategies are also the minimizers
of the original price functional C .
We turn to the reduction of Ξ̂ to deterministic strategies. Let us define the remaining






ξn for t ≤ T
0 for t > T
. (79)
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Observe that (Xt)t≥0 is a bounded, predictable process for an admissible strategy ξ.












and use definition (79) as well as integration by parts to rewrite the first term on




















But, we know that (Xt)t≥0 is a bounded, predictable process and A
0 is a martingale,
and thus, the expectation of (81) must be X0A0. The second term on the right hand
side of (80) is deterministic for a given realization of a strategy ξ(ω). We denote
this term by








for version i, i ∈ {1, 2}. Now, we can express C̄ by
C̄ (ξ) = A0X0 + E(C(i)(ξ)). (83)
We spend the next two section to show C(i) has a unique minimiser in the set
Ξ :=
{






and this minimiser is determined by the formula given in theorem 4.2 or 4.1, respec-
tively.
For the sake of convenience, we introduce some more notation:
āx := exp(−τ ρ̄(x)) for x ∈ R, (85)
an :=
{
exp(−τ ρ̄(Etn+)) in section A.1
exp(−τ ρ̄(Dtn+)) in section A.2
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. (86)
Because the range of ρ̄ is assumed to be [k,K], 0 < k < K < ∞, by (48),
e−τK ≤ āx ≤ e−τk and e−τK ≤ an ≤ e−τk. (87)




xf(x)dx and G(x) := F̃ (F−1(x)). (88)
Observe that




and thus, G is twice continuously differentiable, non-negative, convex and has a
fixed point in 0.
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A.1 The optimal strategy for version 1
In this section, we calculate the unique minimiser of C(1) in Ξ. For any ξ =

















Lemma A.2. The function C(1) has at least one local minimum in Ξ.
Proof. The statement will follow from
C(1)(ξ) →∞ for ||ξ||∞ →∞ (91)
because C(1) is continuous. At first, we use the properties of G to find a lower bound
for G(x)−G(cx), x ∈ R and c ∈ [0, 1]:
G(x)−G(cx) ≥ G(cx) + (x− cx)G′(cx)−G(cx) (92)
= (1− c)|F−1(cx)||x|.
The inequality (92) also leads to a lower bound for C(1) by using (90):












































∣∣F−1 (an [(Πn−1m=0am) x0 + · · ·+ an1xn−1 + xn])∣∣
∣∣an [(Πn−1m=0am) x0 + · · ·+ an1xn−1 + xn]∣∣ ].
We define a linear mapping T : RN+1 → RN+1 by
T (ξ) :=
(








and the smallest an by
a := min{an : n ∈ {0, . . . , N}}. (95)
Observe that
||T (ξ)||∞ ≥ ||(x0, ax0 + x1, . . . , a
nx0 + · · ·+ axN−1 + xN)||∞ →∞ (96)
for ||ξ||∞ →∞ as well as G(x) →∞ and |F−1(ax)||x| → ∞ for |x| → ∞. The last






Also H(x) →∞ for x →∞, and consequently,
C(1)(ξ) ≥ H(||T (ξ)||∞)−G(0) →∞. (98)










in theorem (4.2). We define the function
ĥ1(x) := h1(x)− F−1 (X0 −N(1− āx)x) (100)
for which ξ
(1)
0 is a zero.
Lemma A.3. Given that the assumptions of theorem 4.2 hold, function ĥ1 has at
most one zero, which is positive if it exists.
Proof. For the existence of at most one zero, it is sufficient to show that ĥ1 is
strictly increasing. The function h1 has a fixed point in 0, is positive for positive
arguments and continuous as well as bijective, thus it must be strictly increasing or,






F−1 (X0 −Nx(1− āx))
]′
(101)
= h′1(x) + N
1− āx (1− τ ρ̄′(x)x)
f(F−1(X0 −Nx(1− āx)))
, (102)
and the numerator of the second term is positive by assumption (63). The positivity
of the zero (if existing) follows simply from
ĥ1(0) = −F−1(X0) < 0. (103)
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Proof. We show first that
∂
∂xn




for n ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 2}. Convince yourself that
an = āxn+Etn (105)






































[an (1− τ ρ̄′(Etn+)Etn+)] .


















F−1(Etm + xm)− F−1(Etm)
]















The same calculation for ∂/∂xn+1 results in
∂
∂xn+1











Combining both results yields the desired equation.
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Now, we are prepared to prove theorem 4.2.
Lemma A.5. Strategy ξ(1) is the unique minimiser of function C(1) and all compo-
nents of ξ(1) are positive.
Proof. We showed in lemma A.2 that there is an optimal strategy ξ∗ = (x∗0, . . . , x
∗
N) ∈
Ξ. Thus, there must be a Lagrange multiplier ν ∈ R such that
∂
∂x∗n
C(1)(ξ∗) = ν for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. (107)
Applying lemma A.4 yields





⇔ ν = F
−1(Etn+)− an (1− ρ̄′(Etn+)Etn+) F−1(anEtn+)
1− an (1− ρ̄′(Etn+)Etn+)
= h1(Etn+) (109)




x∗n = (1− a0)x∗0 for n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} (111)
x∗N = X0 − x∗0 − (N − 1)x∗0(1− a0). (112)
Therefore, the optimal strategy ξ∗ is completely defined if we can determine x∗0. By
(90),
C(1)(x∗) = G(x∗0)−G(0) + (N − 1) [G(a0x∗0 + (1− a0)x∗0)−G(a0x∗0)]
+G(a0x
∗
0 + X0 − x∗0 − (N − 1)(1− a0)x∗0)−G(a0x∗0)






We know that C
(1)









F−1(x)− āx[1− τ ρ̄′(x)x]F−1(āxx)
− (1− āx[1− τ ρ̄′(x)x]) F−1(X0 −N(1− āx)x)
]
= N (1− āx[1− τ ρ̄′(x)x]) ĥ1(x).
Assumption (63) and lemma A.3 tell us C(1) has exactly one minimum, and this
minimum is positive. We have established the uniqueness and representation of the
optimal strategy.
It remains to show that all components of x∗ are positive. We already know that
x∗0 > 0. The positivity of x
∗
n follows from (111) for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. For
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0 = F−1(x∗0)− a0(1− τ ρ̄′(x∗0)x∗0)F−1(a0x∗0)









0)− F−1(a0x∗0 + x∗N)
]
, (116)
which, indeed, implies the positivity of x∗N .
A.2 The optimal strategy for version 2












G(xn + F (Dtn))− F̃ (Dtn)
)
Lemma A.6. The function C(2) has a local minimum in Ξ.
Proof. Again, it suffices to show
C(2)(ξ) →∞ for ||ξ||∞ →∞. (118)






F̃ (F−1(xn + F (Dtn)))− F̃ (Dtn)
)
= F̃ (aNF











F̃ (F−1(xn + F (Dtn)))− F̃ (anF−1(xn + F (Dtn)))
)
A lower bound for the last line of (119) is given by


























tends to infinity for |x| → ∞. Finally, we introduce the mapping
T (x) := (x0, x1 + F (Dt1), . . . , xN + F (DtN )), (122)
for which C(2)(x) ≥ H(||T (x)||∞) holds. It remains to show that ||T (x)||∞ → ∞
for |x| → ∞. Let us assume there is a sequence xk such that ||xk||∞ → ∞ but
T (xk) remains bounded. This implies especially the boundedness of (xk0). But then
again, Dkt1 = a
k
0F
−1(xk0) remains bounded. We can continue the argumentation
for all coordinates of T (x) and conclude that (xkn) is a bounded sequence for all
n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. This contradicts the assumption, and thus the lemma is proven.
Lemma A.7. Under the assumptions of theorem 4.1, equation (52) has at most one
solution, which is positive if existing. Furthermore, g(x) := f(x) − āxf(āxx)(1 −
τ ρ̄′(x)x) is positive.











are strictly increasing. In this case, at most one zero can exist, and its positivity is
guaranteed by h2(F
−1(0)) = 0 and ĥ2(0) = −F (X0) < 0. The function h2 is strictly







f(ε)− ā2εf(āεε)(1− τ ρ̄′(ε)ε)




















This expression is strictly positive because the numerator is strictly positive as we
show next. We define both
k(x) := f(x)− āxf(āxx)(1− τ ρ̄′(x)x) and
k2(x) := f(x)− ā2xf(āxx)(1− τ ρ̄′(x)x).
(127)
The numerater of (126) can be expressed by k(F−1(x)), and furthermore, h2(x) =
xk2(x)/k(x). Both functions k and k2 are continuous, and due to the properties of
h explained in the beginning of the proof, the functions must have the same sign
for all x ∈ R. The function k2 is greater than k for all x ∈ R; thus, there can be
no change of signs and we have either k(x) > 0 and k2(x) > 0 or k(x) < 0 and
k2(x) < 0 for all x. Because k(0) = f(0)(1− ā0) > 0, positivity is proven.
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F−1(xm + F (Dtm))−Dtm
] )
.












F−1(xm + F (Dtm))−Dtm
]
, (131)
and combining (130) and (131) yields the desired result.
Finally, we are prepared to prove theorem 4.1.
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Lemma A.9. Strategy ξ(2) is the unique minimiser of function C(2) and all compo-
nents of ξ(2) are positive.
Proof. Lemma A.6 guarantees the existence of at least one optimal strategy ξ∗ ∈ Ξ.
By standard arguments, there is a Lagrange multiplier ν ∈ R such that
∂
∂x∗n
C(2)(ξ∗) = ν for n ∈ {0, . . . , N}. (132)
We use lemma A.8 to get
ν = Dtn+ +
anf(anDtn+)
f(Dtn+)
(1− τ ρ̄′(Dtn+)Dtn+) [ν − anDtn+] (133)
⇔ ν = Dtn+
f(Dtn+)− a2nf(anDtn+)(1− τ ρ̄′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
f(Dtn+)− anf(anDtn+)(1− τ ρ̄′(Dtn+)Dtn+)
= h2(Dtn+) (134)
for n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Function h2 is one-to-one, and thus,
ν = h2(F
−1(x∗n + F (Dtn))) (135)
implies that x∗n + F (Dtn) does not depend on n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Consequently,
Dtn+ = F
−1(x∗n + F (Dtn)) is constant in n such that we can conclude





0 − F (Dtn) = x∗0 − F (a0F−1(x∗0)) for n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, (137)
x∗N = X0 − x∗0 − (N − 1)
[
x∗0 − F (a0F−1(x∗0))
]
. (138)











, . . . , X0 − x0 − (N − 1)
[









+ G(X0 −N [x0 − F (a0F−1(x0))])− F̃ (a0F−1(x0))

















(1− τ ρ̄′(D0+)D0+)− 1
)]
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The left hand side of the last line can be rewritten as
DtN+ = F
−1(F (DtN ) + x
∗
N) (141)
= F−1(F (Dt1) + X0 − x∗0 − (N − 1)(x∗0 − F (Dt1)))
= F−1(X0 −N(x∗0 − F (Dt1))
and the right hand side is just h2(F
−1(x∗0)). We know by lemma A.7 that equation
(140) has at most one zero such that we are finished with the existence, uniqueness
and representation of the optimal strategy.
At last, we show that all components of this strategy are positive. We already know
x∗0 > 0 and thus also x
∗
n > 0 for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} by (137). For the positivity










The fraction on the right hand side is strictly positive by lemma A.7; positivity of
x∗N follows from
DtN+ > D0+ =
DtN
a0
> DtN . (143)
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